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The Right to Work and the Right to Strike 
Laura Weinrib† 
This term, the Supreme Court will consider Janus v. AFSCME, the 
newest installment in an antilabor campaign on behalf of a constitu-
tionally protected “right to work.”1 Drawing on recent business-friendly 
First Amendment decisions, opponents of organized labor contend that 
“fair-share” agency fee agreements, which require non-members of a 
union to pay their proportionate share of collective bargaining and con-
tract administration expenses, can no longer weather constitutional 
scrutiny.2 These advocates argue that the extent to which employees 
within a bargaining unit are required to contribute to the costs incurred 
on their behalf by a labor organization designated to represent them 
should be deferred neither to agreements between unions and employ-
ers nor to the legislative process. Rather, they urge the Court to prohibit 
any such payment as a matter of constitutional law. 
Whatever their policy preferences, commentators have regarded 
the new judicial openness to economically inflected free expression 
claims of the kind proposed in Janus v. AFSCME as a departure from, 
or at least a significant extension of, traditional First Amendment prin-
ciples.3 By contrast, this essay demonstrates that advocates articulated 
related arguments as early as the 1930s, when the modern First 
Amendment took shape. Moreover, although they did not yet prevail in 
court, such arguments helped to garner broad-based support for the Su-
preme Court’s speech-protective turn at a time when liberals and labor 
groups were deeply suspicious of court-centered constitutionalism.4 Yet 
to the extent they were credited at all, antiunion First Amendment 
 
 † Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. I thank Kate Andrias, Alex 
Gourevitch, and Sophia Lee for helpful comments. The essay benefited from a rich discussion with 
participants at The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium. I am grateful for support from 
the Karl R. Janitzky Memorial Fund. 
 1 On the history of the term “right to work” and contestation over its meaning, see SOPHIA Z. 
LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 60 (2014). 
 2 See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2014). 
 3 For an overview of recent developments involving labor law and the First Amendment, see 
infra Part I. 
 4 Labor and liberal antipathy toward judicial review is discussed in Part II. 
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claims were a secondary component of the perceived First Amendment 
bundle, which also included a robust right to strike. In fact, the right to 
strike was the core issue around which the interwar civil liberties move-
ment coalesced.5 
Soon after extending constitutional protection to labor activity, the 
Supreme Court reversed course, concerned that insulating labor rela-
tions from state regulation would exacerbate industrial unrest and rep-
licate the judicial overreaching it so recently had repudiated. Over the 
ensuing decades, it backed away from strong First Amendment protec-
tion in the labor law domain, a retreat that applied to pro- and anti-
union activity alike. It denied constitutionally protected status to sec-
ondary boycotts, wildcat strikes, and mass picketing even as it rejected 
claims to the associational autonomy of individual workers.6 But its 
anomalous analysis in First Amendment labor cases always was 
roughly even-handed. As it weighs the arguments in Janus v. AFSCME, 
the Supreme Court would do well to contemplate the consequences of 
unraveling a constitutional compromise that has proven stable for more 
than half a century. 
I. LABOR LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In Janus v. AFSCME, the Supreme Court will confront a now fa-
miliar question: whether public sector agency fee arrangements that 
compel non-members to contribute to a union’s contract negotiation and 
administration expenses are consistent with the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. That is a question the Court has long 
since answered in the affirmative but that antiunion advocates have 
repeatedly urged it to reconsider.7 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted federal private sector labor law to permit union security 
agreements but to prohibit a labor organization from requiring employ-
 
 5 These arguments are developed in Part III. 
 6 See infra Part III and the conclusion. 
 7 For the history of the arguments in these cases and the advocates who advanced them, see 
LEE, supra note 1; Joseph A. McCartin, “A Wagner Act for Public Employees”: Labor’s Deferred 
Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970–1976, 95 J. AM. HIST. 123 (2008). 
20 WEINRIB PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/17  9:12 PM 
513] THE RIGHT TO WORK AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 515 
 
ees to become members or contribute financially to its political or ideo-
logical activity.8 In its 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu-
cation,9 the Court extended that rule to public sector employees. That 
is, although Abood prevented states from compelling public employees 
to join a union or to pay toward a union’s political expenses, the Court 
deemed it constitutionally permissible to collect mandatory contribu-
tions toward a union’s “chargeable expenses,”10 including the costs of 
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjust-
ment.11 States were therefore free to authorize the same modified 
agency shop arrangements that were common in private sector work-
places governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)12 and Rail-
way Labor Act.13 
The Supreme Court revisited this issue in Harris v. Quinn,14 a 2014 
challenge to a public sector fair-share arrangement involving Illinois 
home health workers. A five-justice majority ruled for the petitioners, 
who were assisted by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foun-
dation, on the narrow factual grounds that they were not full-fledged 
state employees. Encouraged by dicta in Harris that was extremely crit-
ical of Abood, the right-to-work movement pressed forward.15 Just two 
years later, in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n,16 the non-mem-
bers asked the Court to invalidate a California public sector agency 
shop arrangement. They argued that there is no constitutionally rele-
vant distinction between lobbying the government and bargaining with 
the government, because the issues at stake in public sector collective 
bargaining invariably implicate important public interests.17 Many ob-
 
 8 The early cases involved the Railway Labor Act. Ry. Emp.’s Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 
721 (1956) (holding that the union shop agreements permitted by the Railway Labor Act do not 
violate the First Amendment); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768–69 (1961) 
(construing the Railway Labor Act to prohibit the use of non-members’ dues for political causes). 
Street was extended to the NLRA in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
 9 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 10 In Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012), the Supreme Court defined 
“chargeable expenses” as “the cost of union services related to collective bargaining” and as distinct 
from the union’s “political or ideological projects.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 232, included among charge-
able expenses the costs of “collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjust-
ment purposes.” 
 11 Abood, 431 U.S. at 232. 
 12 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2016). 
 13 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2016). 
 14 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 15 Id. at 2632. 
 16 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). 
 17 Brief for Petitioners at 10–11, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) 
(No. 14-915), 2015 WL 5261564. The petitioners argued in the alternative that unions should be 
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servers anticipated that a five-justice majority would seize the oppor-
tunity to declare agency fees unconstitutional.18 But the Court did not 
issue its decision until March 2016, after the death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia. The eight remaining justices deadlocked, leaving Abood intact. 
Like his precursors, Illinois state employee Mark Janus—with le-
gal representation from the National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation and the Illinois-based Liberty Justice Center—seeks to per-
suade the Supreme Court that public sector agency fees are incompati-
ble with today’s First Amendment landscape. Indeed, the petition for 
writ of certiorari in Janus v. AFSCME describes this central and 
longstanding feature of public sector labor law as “the largest regime of 
compelled speech in the nation.”19 With the addition to the Court of Jus-
tice Neil Gorsuch, it is widely expected that a five-justice majority will 
accept the persistent invitation to overrule Abood and impose a right-
to-work regime on all public sector workers.20 
The American labor law system is an unusual one, and it reflects a 
complicated balancing by legislatures and the courts of individual and 
group rights, as well as broader structural issues.21 The prevailing ap-
proach, which is modeled on the NLRA, allows workers to determine as 
a group whether union representation will serve their interests.22 Once 
a union has attained the support of a majority of employees within a 
designated bargaining unit, it represents all the workers within the 
unit on an exclusive basis.23 Many state governments have opted to bar-
gain with the unions that represent majorities of their workers, just as 
federal law requires most private sector employers to do.24 In exchange, 
employers—whether public or private sector—are usually shielded 
 
permitted to collect contributions toward chargeable expenses only from non-members who opted 
in to payments. Id. at 15. 
 18 See, e.g., Amy Howe, Union Fees in Jeopardy: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 
2016, 5:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/union-fees-in-jeopardy-in-plain-english [htt 
ps://perma.cc/T8HX-TH2A]. 
 19 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Janus v. AFSCME, 8. 
 20 E.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Hear Case on Mandatory Fees to Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2017 (noting that Gorsuch “is likely to supply a fifth vote against the unions”). 
 21 See generally Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
169, 221–24 (2015). Estlund’s insightful analysis focuses on the post Taft-Hartley period. This 
essay emphasizes that in the labor context, ambivalence over the First Amendment, and especially 
its relationship to the right to strike and the right to work, stretches back to the earliest days of 
the NLRA and is rooted in the constitutional cases of the early twentieth century. 
 22 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1977). 
 23 NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), § 159(a) (2012) (“Representatives designated or selected for 
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining.”). 
 24 The duty to bargain does not, however, “compel either party to agree to a proposal.” Id. at 
§ 158(d). 
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from contending with demands by competing unions.25 They need not 
negotiate or enforce multiple contracts. And they are protected from 
costly recognitional and secondary strikes.26 
Of course, employees who object to union representation, whether 
they favor an alternative union or oppose all unions, are not without 
recourse. If a majority of employees are dissatisfied with a union, they 
can vote to decertify it. If dissenting employees are in the minority, they 
are free to express their disapproval of union policies, to refuse to par-
ticipate in strikes, and to withhold payment of fees that exceed what 
Abood and its private sector analogs allowed.27 Moreover, a mix of state 
statutes and case law imposes on unions a “duty of fair representation,” 
which prohibits them from retaliating against or otherwise disfavoring 
non-members.28 That is, any wage increases or benefits the union nego-
tiates on behalf of its members extend to non-members as well—even 
when it would advantage members to trade the interests of non-mem-
bers for enhanced benefits for themselves—and unions are obligated to 
represent non-members just as vigorously in grievance and arbitration 
procedures.29 
The result is the much-debated free rider problem, which Justice 
Scalia construed a quarter-century ago as creating a “compelling state 
interest” sufficient to justify a state in “permit[ting] the union to de-
mand reimbursement.”30 In the absence of a duty of fair representation, 
employees who desired to share in union-negotiated benefits would 
have no choice but to join the union. By contrast, employees have little 
 
 25 See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65–70 (1975) (re-
jecting the argument that national anti-discrimination policy requires an exception to the principle 
of exclusive representation where employees “seek to bargain separately with their employer as to 
the elimination of racially discriminatory employment practices”). 
 26 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) 
(recognitional picketing); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (secondary activity). 
 27 See, e.g., Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115–16 (1985) (upholding NLRB’s 
construction of the NLRA to prohibit a union from fining employees who had tendered their resig-
nation during a strike). 
 28 The duty of fair representation originated in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 
192, 202–03 (1944). 
 29 As a matter of statutory rather than constitutional law, states may elect to prohibit “agree-
ments requiring membership in a labor organization.” The language of section 14(b), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 164(b), part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA, is generally thought to 
permit states to prohibit agency fees, though this reading is dictated neither by the text of the 
statute nor by Supreme Court precedent. See, for example, Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Consti-
tutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 221–24 (2015); Catherine Fisk & Benjamin Sachs, Re-
storing Equity in Right to Work Laws, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 859, 862–68 (2014). 
 30 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment 
in part and dissenting in part); see also Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 753 (1988); 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224–26 (1977); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 
U.S. 740, 767 (1961). 
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direct incentive to contribute financially to a union that is legally re-
quired to represent them just as zealously as members. The fewer the 
number of dues-paying members, the less effective the union becomes, 
which in turn renders the remaining members less eager to pay dues. 
Fair-share agency fees long ago emerged as the most tenable solution. 
Opponents of Abood point to other areas of First Amendment law 
in which the Supreme Court has recognized compelled payments and 
subsidies as unconstitutional. Some of those cases postdate Abood, rais-
ing the possibility that public sector fair-share fees are no longer con-
sistent with First Amendment doctrine.31 There are plausible argu-
ments to be made on both sides of this debate. And yet, as a matter of 
First Amendment doctrine, as well as sound public policy, the status of 
fair-share fees cannot be divorced from the broader labor law regime in 
which they are situated. Abood reflects a careful balance between the 
associational rights of unions and their members, on the one hand, and 
the rights of non-members to opt out on the other.32 More starkly, to the 
extent that fair-share fees trench on otherwise insulated First Amend-
ment terrain, they are hardly the worst offenders within the labor law 
domain. After all, state legislation as well as federal labor law expressly 
curtails First Amendment activity that is virtually immune from regu-
lation in other contexts, including the ability of workers to picket, boy-
cott, and strike. 
In short, from a historical perspective, the question whether com-
pelled contributions toward chargeable expenses by public sector em-
ployees are closer to mushroom-growing subsidies33 or integrated bar 
dues34 is somewhat beside the point. The crucial question is why the 
Supreme Court has proven so reluctant to extend even paradigmatic 
 
 31 See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001) (refusing to uphold “com-
pelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself ”); 
Knox v. SEIU, Loc. 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012) (noting that past holdings permitting closed 
shop agreements and opt-out billing schemes “have substantially impinged on the First Amend-
ment rights of nonmembers” and rejecting “any further impingement”). 
 32 Catherine Fisk and Margaux Poueymirou have persuasively argued that compelled repre-
sentation of non-members in the absence of agency fees, which is necessarily funded by the pay-
ments of members who would prefer not to subsidize non-members, is a First Amendment violation 
to precisely the same extent as compelled payment of dues by non-members who would prefer not 
to subsidize the union and its members. That is, either both or neither are unconstitutional. Cath-
erine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled 
Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439 (2015); see also Catherine Fisk & Benjamin Sachs, Restoring 
Equity in Right to Work Laws, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 857, 862–68 (2014). 
 33 United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
 34 Like Abood, cases on integrated bar dues have precluded use of compulsory fees for political 
purposes. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Kingstad v. State Bar, 622 F.3d 708 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
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First Amendment protections to labor unions, employers, and dissent-
ing employees. Understanding today’s speech-restrictive labor law re-
gime requires exhuming a historical world that has slipped from view. 
A constitutional prohibition on fair-share agency fees would alter a 
single component of a complicated labor law system without regard to 
related provisions. In our period of low union density and relative labor 
quiescence—in which some combination of legal, social, and economic 
impediments has rendered even simple work stoppages virtually non-
existent35—judges and advocates have forgotten a phenomenon that the 
Abood Court grasped well. In the context of labor law, the First Amend-
ment is a precarious thread, and pulling on it threatens to unravel the 
whole structure of American labor relations. 
II. ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE LOCHNER ERA 
That the subsidence of American labor unrest has coincided with a 
new judicial openness to economically inflected First Amendment 
claims is presumably no accident. The Janus case is part of a mounting 
effort to challenge social and economic regulation through the guise of 
the First Amendment. The past decades have witnessed a marked shift 
in First Amendment law from the protection of disfavored minorities 
against state suppression to the insulation of industrial interests 
against government regulation.36 That effort has overlapped almost 
perfectly with the decline in labor’s power, whose symbolic harbinger—
President Ronald Reagan’s hiring of permanent replacements in the 
1981 air traffic controller strike—came just months after the Supreme 
Court issued a watershed decision on promotional advertising that re-
flected increasing resistance to the regulation of commercial speech.37 
Today, as labor struggles to redefine its role and relevance and to im-
agine a legal regime more conducive to its political and economic goals,38 
 
 35 In 2015, the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded twelve major strikes 
and lockouts involving a total of 47,000 workers. During the mid-twentieth century, annual totals 
sometimes approached five hundred major strikes and over two million workers. Economic News 
Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp. 
t01.htm [https://perma.cc/G6HC-R8MM] (last modified Feb. 9, 2017). 
 36 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and 
Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 223 (2015). For early analysis of this transformation, see 
MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH (1991); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (Free Press 1993). 
 37 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Supreme 
Court had already narrowed the permissible regulation of informational advertising in Virginia 
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). On the significance of the 
PATCO strike, see JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC 
CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2011). 
 38 See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1 (2016). 
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empirical evidence suggests that almost half of First Amendment victo-
ries benefit business corporations and trade groups challenging unwel-
come regulatory interventions.39 
This transformation has aptly been labeled the Lochnerization of 
the First Amendment,40 on the theory that businesses are using the 
First Amendment to do the work that substantive due process once per-
formed in the era of Lochner v. New York,41 the notorious 1905 Supreme 
Court case invalidating a New York maximum-hours law for bakers as 
an infringement of liberty of contract.42 That is, like liberty of contract 
in the early twentieth century, the First Amendment is being used to-
day to dismantle burdensome regulatory regimes. 
The literature characterizes this transformation as a new direction 
in First Amendment law, but from the standpoint of the interwar coali-
tion that litigated the foundational First Amendment cases, it might 
better be classified as a course correction. As I have argued elsewhere, 
the Lochnerization of the First Amendment began many decades ago. 
In fact, it began almost the instant that Lochner itself was put to rest. 
Lochner’s anti-regulatory constitutionalism was embedded in the First 
Amendment at the moment that the so-called New Deal settlement was 
struck. And it was integrally related to Progressive Era labor conflict.43 
Today, Lochner-era jurisprudence is most closely identified with 
the cases whose facts resemble Lochner’s: cases, that is, in which state 
and federal courts invalidated legislative efforts to improve workplace 
safety or dictate the terms of employment. For the early labor move-
ment, however, such decisions represented only one component of a 
broader judicial hostility to workers’ rights. For example, the Supreme 
Court’s 1897 decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,44 which first read liberty 
 
 39 See Coates, supra note 36, at 250–52. 
 40 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384; Morton Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: 
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109–16 (1993) (discussing 
“The Lochnerization of the First Amendment”); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s 
First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. 
L. REV. 133 (2016). Recent scholarship has examined the significance of the deregulatory First 
Amendment in the labor context. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment 
at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (2016); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: 
Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 100 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016); Cynthia Estlund, Truth, 
Lies, and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. 349 (2017). 
 41 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 42 Id. at 64. 
 43 See generally LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES 
COMPROMISE (2016) [hereinafter WEINRIB, TAMING]; Laura Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the 
Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297; Laura Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, 
and the Limits of State Power, 1917–1940 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Uni-
versity). 
 44 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
20 WEINRIB PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/17  9:12 PM 
513] THE RIGHT TO WORK AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 521 
 
of contract into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
hamstrung unions as much as or more than progressive legislatures. 
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the federal ju-
diciary cabined legislative power to authorize union activity while ex-
panding its own authority to curtail strikes and boycotts.45 In 1908, the 
Supreme Court struck down a federal prohibition on anti-union dis-
crimination in the railroad industry for abridging workers’ freedom of 
contract under the Fifth Amendment.46 In 1915, it extended that hold-
ing to the states.47 Relying on “constitutional freedom of contract” under 
the Fourteenth Amendment,48 it invalidated a state law that made it 
unlawful for an employer to require an employee to enter into an agree-
ment “not to join or become or remain a member of any labor organiza-
tion or association, as a condition of such person or persons securing 
employment.”49 Rejecting the state’s asserted effort to limit employer 
“coercion” and to ensure the liberty of workers to join organizations of 
their choosing, the Court construed the targeted yellow-dog contracts as 
advancing the right of an employee “to work for whom he will.”50 Two 
years later, it upheld a controversial injunction against the United 
Mine Workers that encompassed efforts to persuade workers to join the 
union, because the prospective recruits had exercised their “constitu-
tional rights of personal liberty and private property” by signing yellow-
dog contracts.51 And in 1921, the newly appointed chief justice William 
Howard Taft issued an opinion in Truax v. Corrigan,52 which was casti-
gated by labor for its apparent partiality to employers. Invalidating a 
state statute that limited the authority of judges to issue injunctions in 
labor disputes, the majority denounced labor picketing as “moral coer-
cion by illegal annoyance and obstruction” and concluded that “a law 
which operates to make lawful such a wrong . . . deprives the owner of 
the business and the premises of his property without due process.”53 
Even as the Supreme Court invalidated anti-yellow dog laws for 
abridging liberty of contract, it denied constitutional protection to labor 
 
 45 See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO 
CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN 
LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); CHRIS TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, 
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960 (1985). 
 46 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908). 
 47 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13 (1915). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 6. 
 50 Id. at 23. 
 51 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 251 (1917). 
 52 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
 53 Id. at 328. 
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tactics, including the boycott and the strike. In Gompers v. Buck’s Stove 
& Range Co.,54 the Court rejected out of hand the notion that the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor’s (AFL’s) “We Don’t Patronize List,” which cat-
aloged employers that the AFL considered “unfair,” was protected First 
Amendment expression.55 As a spokesperson for the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers (NAM) explained, it was every bit as legitimate 
“to enjoin the use of [a man’s] hands or his feet or his head to do some 
unlawful thing” as it was “to use the injunction in connection with the 
use of the tongue.”56 
The same reasoning undergirded the Taft Court’s decisions during 
the 1920s. In 1926, three years after invalidating a state compulsory 
arbitration statute for unduly burdening businesses,57 the Court upheld 
the criminal conviction of a union officer under the same law for engag-
ing in a strike.58 The majority opinion decisively rejected labor’s attempt 
to ground the right to strike in either the common law or the Constitu-
tion.59 Indeed, according to the courts, laws prohibiting strikes and boy-
cotts served rather than impeded personal liberty. “The labor unions 
and [their] officers,” reflected a lower court in Buck’s Stove, “meddle 
into a member’s daily affairs deeper than does the law; restrict him in 
matters that the law leaves free.”60 
In the face of such decisions, labor leaders and their allies charged 
the courts with hypocrisy.61 Increasingly, they accused the judiciary of 
erecting a labor law regime best characterized as “Heads, I win; Tails, 
you lose.”62 During the 1910s, progressives launched a frontal assault 
on the courts, along with common law legalism and constitutionalism.63 
Mainstream lawyers and politicians introduced various proposals to 
 
 54 221 U.S. 418 (1911). 
 55 Id. at 439. 
 56 See U.S. COMM’N ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO 
CONGRESS BY THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 64-415, at 10,823 (State-
ment of James A. Emery, May 18, 1915). 
 57 See Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Rel., 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923). 
 58 See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Transcript of Record at 627, Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) 
(No. 372). 
 61 See WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 43, at ch. 1. 
 62 U.S. COMM’N ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 10,895 (1st Sess. 
1916) (Additional Statement of Theodore Schroeder, May 27, 1915). 
 63 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); MORTON 
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY (1992); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST 
FORMALISM (1949); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW 
AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937 187–97 (1998); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: 
SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003). 
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curb judicial overreaching, and many states enacted provisions for the 
democratic recall of judges. Concerns about the courts were sufficiently 
pervasive that former president Theodore Roosevelt, campaigning for a 
return to the White House on the Progressive Party ticket, promoted 
the “recall of judicial decisions” and pronounced it “absolutely necessary 
for the people themselves to take control of the interpretation of the 
constitution.”64 Even some conservatives fretted that the judiciary’s 
fiercely antilabor jurisprudence was straining popular confidence in the 
courts and “endanger[ing] imbedded political and constitutional tradi-
tions of due process,” along with the American commitment to rule of 
law.65 
The campaign to curtail judicial power flagged during the 1920s, 
when a combination of economic prosperity and state-sanctioned anti-
labor offensives dampened union influence. In 1924, the plank of the 
Progressive Party platform urging abolition of “the tyranny and usur-
pation of the courts, including the practice of nullifying legislation in 
conflict with the political, social or economic theories of the judges,” 
found few supporters outside labor circles.66 But within a decade, judi-
cial inflexibility in the face of the Great Depression made demands for 
reform more urgent than ever. Notably, a reinvigorated labor move-
ment was instrumental in reviving the attack on Lochner-era constitu-
tionalism.67 After all, in the face of rising labor militancy, a decisive 
congressional majority passed the NLRA in 1935.68 As violent strikes 
roiled the nation, the statute aimed to improve economic conditions and 
reduce labor unrest by legitimating union activity.69 Yet business 
groups actively advised their members to disregard their obligations to 
bargain with unions under the NLRA, on the theory that the Supreme 
 
 64 Progressive Party Platform, 1924, in GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT DAY, 1864–1981, vol. 3, 326 (Richard Hofstadter & Beatrice K. 
Hofstadter eds., rev. ed. 1982); Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert David Croly, in Theo-
dore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (Feb. 29, 1912), http://www.the 
odorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record/?libID=o224709 [https://perma.cc/SC4S 
-QJRB]. 
 65 Charles O. Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 ABA J. 709, 710 (1940). 
 66 See, e.g., La Follette Has No Answer to Charges Made by Dawes, ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA, 
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 12, 1924; A Platform of Business Principles, NATION’S BUSINESS, Dec. 1924, 
at 37. 
 67 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 149–253 (1974); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 
201–71 (1982). 
 68 NLRA, 29 USC §§ 151–69. On the passage of the NLRA, see CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE 
EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 56–80 (2005); 
GROSS, supra note 67; IRONS, supra note 67. 
 69 IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933–1941 
(1969). 
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Court was certain to consider it an unconstitutional incursion on the 
property rights of employers and an unconstitutional interference with 
the liberty of antiunion employees.70 
By the mid-1930s, of course, the very future of judicial review was 
in jeopardy. President Franklin Roosevelt’s much maligned Court-pack-
ing plan met political resistance for its disingenuous reliance on 
strained judicial resources and its perceived aggrandizement of execu-
tive, in place of judicial, power.71 Other proposals, however, had ample 
support. And many of them, including calls to abolish judicial review by 
constitutional amendment, promised far greater inroads on judicial au-
thority. In congressional hearings on the Court-packing plan and in im-
passioned public debate over the future of the courts, the judiciary’s 
mistreatment of organized labor played an outsize role. To unions, vic-
tory in their decades-long battle against Lochner-era constitutionalism 
at last appeared within reach. 
III. FROM THE RIGHT TO STRIKE TO THE RIGHT TO WORK 
As events unfolded, court-curbing measures proved unnecessary, 
because in the spring of 1937 the Supreme Court unexpectedly changed 
course. Ever since the Supreme Court handed them down, its decisions 
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish72 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.73 have been described as the opening shots of a revolution in con-
stitutional law.74 As future Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson 
observed, the “avalanche of victories” issued that spring—which consti-
tuted “a legal revolution, as real and meaningful as any ever fought on 
a field of battle”—“were the greatest days in labor’s legal history.”75 In 
 
 70 The American Bar Association concluded that such advice by the American Liberty League 
was ethical. See Professional Ethics Committee Rules Organization and Offer of National Lawyers 
Committee Not Unethical, 21 ABA J. 776, 777–78 (1934). 
 71 See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION 
AND WAR 15–30 (1995); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT (2010); BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE 
TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY (2009). 
 72 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 73 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 74 On the constitutional revolution, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT 
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); RICHARD A. 
MAIDMENT, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE NEW DEAL: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND 
ECONOMIC REGULATION, 1934–1936 (1991); AHR Forum: The Debate over the Constitutional Rev-
olution of 1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1046 (2005). For an internalist explanation of the Court’s 
about-face, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998). 
 75 Robert H. Jackson, Labor’s New Rights and Responsibilities, Aug. 24, 1937, Records of the 
Special Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 1933–1940, Subject Files, 1933–1940, Gen-
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accepting the constitutionality of minimum wage laws and subse-
quently of federal labor law, the Supreme Court definitively abandoned 
its reliance on constitutional liberty and property rights (along with the 
Commerce Clause) and signaled a new deference to government regu-
lation of the economy. 
The esteemed constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin was among 
the first commentators to characterize the 1937 decisions as revolution-
ary, a label he grounded in the Supreme Court’s abandonment of its 
laissez-faire conception of “liberty.”76 That is, what made the decisions 
“so radical” and “so altogether dramatic” was their reconceptualization 
of liberty “as something that may be infringed by other forces as well as 
by those of government; indeed, something that may require the posi-
tive intervention of government against those other forces.”77 To be 
sure, the Court did not identify this new form of liberty as an independ-
ent constitutional right. Even after 1937, neither theorists nor advo-
cates ordinarily argued that state assistance for organized labor was 
constitutionally compelled. Still, Corwin’s insight would prove crucial 
in interpreting the NLRA and in deflecting subsequent constitutional 
attacks on the statutory framework. 
Looking forward, however, the late 1930s constitutional moment 
was even more revolutionary than Corwin anticipated. The New Deal 
Supreme Court did not stop at stripping employers of their Lochner-era 
liberty and property rights. Even as it wrote employers’ antiunion ap-
peals to freedom of contract out of the Constitution, it wrote First 
Amendment protection for labor’s most powerful tactics in. 
In its famous fourth footnote in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,78 the Supreme Court flagged an exception to its new, hands-off ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation: it would continue to subject 
laws to exacting judicial scrutiny where they burdened the rights of mi-
norities or infringed freedom of speech.79 Although it is typically re-
garded as a subsequent development, the move to reclassify tradition-
ally economic transactions as expressive ones was part and parcel of the 
new constitutional regime. In fact, the lawyers and litigants who cham-
pioned free speech in the years before Carolene Products were con-
cerned above all with protecting labor’s rights.80 The American Civil 
 
eral Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives and Record Ad-
ministration, box 6, folder Jackson. 
 76 Edward S. Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light, NEW REPUBLIC 354 (Aug. 4, 1937). 
 77 Id. 
 78 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 79 Id. at 152 n.4 (1938). On Carolene Products, see Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: 
A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163 (2004). 
 80 See generally WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 43; Weinrib, Civil Liberties, supra note 43. 
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Liberties Union (ACLU), which unabashedly described itself as a parti-
san of labor in its founding documents,81 promoted what it called a 
“right of agitation”: a right of workers to picket, boycott, and strike.82 
Despite deep ambivalence and even antipathy to constitutional rights 
based claims among the organization’s early leadership,83 much of the 
ACLU’s interwar litigation strategy was meant to make its prolabor 
agenda palatable to the courts. Over the objections of labor movement 
allies who regarded the judiciary as an inevitable abettor of industrial 
interests, the ACLU stubbornly invited the courts to expand First 
Amendment protection of labor picketing. Although it often emphasized 
more anodyne pursuits—including its campaigns for academic and ar-
tistic freedom—its overarching objective was to render workers’ con-
certed activity a constitutional right.84 And particularly after the Su-
preme Court’s spring 1937 decisions blunted substantive due process as 
an antilabor tool, the First Amendment strategy found friendly recep-
tion among labor leaders and their New Deal supporters. 
It is a largely forgotten feature of constitutional history that this 
labor vision of the First Amendment briefly prevailed. Today, the notion 
of a right to strike, picket, and boycott independent of any regulatory 
regime seems fanciful. But amid the industrial unrest of the 1930s, a 
wide range of civil liberties advocates within and outside government 
believed that protecting workers’ collective rights would stave off the 
more extreme violence associated with labor struggles abroad.85 More-
over, few issues seemed more central than labor to the democratic con-
cerns of the First Amendment.86 In Jones & Laughlin Steel, Chief Jus-
tice Charles Evans Hughes called the right of workers to organize a 
 
 81 See, e.g., Walter Nelles, Suggestions for Reorganization of the National Civil Liberties Bu-
reau (undated), in American Civil Liberties Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917–1950, 
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Public Policy Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 
reel 16, vol. 120 (“We are frankly partisans of labor in the present struggle.”). 
 82 See ACLU, THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH 4–5, 15–18 (1921). 
 83 See Laura Weinrib, From Left to Rights: Civil Liberties Lawyering Between the World Wars, 
LAW, CULTURE & HUMANITIES (forthcoming 2017), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/ 
1743872116641871 [https://perma.cc/Q2WU-4XPF]. 
 84 See generally ACLU, supra note 82 (discussing the ACLU’s free speech objectives and focus-
ing on labor rights such as assembly and demonstration, striking, and picketing). 
 85 The same impulse was behind the decision in the NLRA to mandate employer bargaining 
with unions, since the most disruptive strikes often involved demands for employer recognition. 
NLRA section one justifies the statutory regime in part on the basis that “[t]he denial by some 
employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the 
procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest[.]” 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016). 
 86 By contrast, see Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 (2014) (“In the public sector, core 
issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues, but that is generally 
not so in the private sector.”). 
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“fundamental right.”87 The following month, Justice Louis Brandeis is-
sued an opinion in Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union.88 In upholding 
a Wisconsin statute that authorized labor picketing, Brandeis ex-
plained that union members were entitled to publicize the facts of a la-
bor dispute because “freedom of speech is guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution.”89 And the first case to invoke the speech-protective the-
ory of footnote four of Carolene Products was a 1940 labor case, Thorn-
hill v. Alabama,90 in which Justice Frank Murphy upheld the right to 
picket as an expression of ideas.91 “Free discussion concerning the con-
ditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indis-
pensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular 
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,” Murphy 
reasoned.92 Thornhill’s companion case, Carlson v. California,93 added 
that the “liberty of communication” protected by the First Amendment 
also included the peaceful dissemination of “the facts of a labor dispute 
. . . by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner.”94 Although these cases 
are relegated to footnotes in most contemporary constitutional law case-
books, they were considered monumental in their time. Lee Pressman, 
the erstwhile anti-judiciary general counsel of the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations (CIO) who argued Carlson in the Supreme Court, 
expressed increasing confidence in the argument that “labor action is 
nothing more or less than the exercise of constitutional rights.”95 It is 
no wonder that in 1941, Herbert Wechsler adjudged the Supreme 
Court’s decision incorporating the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to be far less important than the labor picketing cases, to 
which he attributed “major significance.”96 
In many respects, the First Amendment strategy for advancing la-
bor’s rights was a risky one. As labor and industry both understood, 
there were deep affinities between the effort to secure constitutional 
protection for workers’ concerted activity and business leaders’ appeal 
 
 87 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). 
 88 301 U.S. 468 (1937). 
 89 Id. at 478. 
 90 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
 91 Id. at 102–05. 
 92 Id. at 103. 
 93 310 U.S. 106 (1940). 
 94 Id. at 113; see also Bakery & Pastry Drivers Loc. 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 774 (1942) 
(recognizing the constitutional right “to express a grievance in a labor matter by publication unat-
tended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive”). 
 95 GILBERT J. GALL, PURSUING JUSTICE: LEE PRESSMAN, THE NEW DEAL, AND THE CIO 108 
(1999). 
 96 Harry Shulman & Herbert Wechsler, Symposium on Civil Liberties, AALS Annual Meeting, 
Chicago, Dec. 27, 1940, 9 AM. L. SCH. REV. 881, 885 (1938–1942). 
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to liberty of contract.97 In fact, the ACLU secured conservative support 
for free speech on precisely that basis, and the unlikely coalition that 
resulted was instrumental in persuading the courts to expand the scope 
of protected First Amendment activity. For example, in the run-up to 
the Court-packing plan, the American Bar Association concluded that 
the best way to preserve judicial review from democratic curtailment 
was to persuade the public of the importance of the handful of civil lib-
erties victories that the ACLU had litigated and the ABA had long op-
posed.98 The ABA’s civil liberties campaign did not forestall the Su-
preme Court’s spring 1937 decisions, which the organization’s next 
president decried as “the most devastating destruction of constitutional 
limitations upon Federal power.”99 Still, the civil liberties campaign 
helped to improve the bar’s negative reputation. And the positive pub-
licity—coupled with the swift realization that after the demise of Loch-
ner-era liberty, civil liberties protections might provide an alternative 
basis for constitutional argumentation when “the rights denied or the 
privacy invaded were those of the business corporation”—led the ABA 
to create a new Committee on the Bill of Rights in 1938.100 Among that 
committee’s first tasks was to submit an amicus brief in a foundational 
First Amendment labor case, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organ-
ization.101 The brief proved to be a public relations triumph, and the 
ABA believed that it exerted considerable influence on the Court.102 
The new fondness for free speech quickly extended from conserva-
tive lawyers to their corporate clients. Although media advocates had 
long defended their business practices as extensions of the freedom of 
the press, other pre-New Deal industrialists were content to rest on 
their property rights, and they typically impugned free speech claims 
for their subversive potential. But the Great Depression eroded the old 
allure of private property as the anchor of American freedom, and so, 
 
 97 See WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 43, at ch. 6. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Frank J. Hogan, Important Shifts in Constitutional Doctrines, 25 ABA J. 629, 630 (1939). 
 100 Frank J. Hogan, Justice, Sure and Speedy, for All, Address to the Annual Meeting of the 
ABA, 29 July 1938, Papers of Grenville Clark in the Dartmouth College Library, ML-7, Rauner 
Special Collections Library, Hanover, NH, box 83, folder 45 [hereinafter Grenville Clark Papers]. 
 101 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance requiring a permit for pub-
lic assembly because the ordinance gave officials broad power for “arbitrary suppression of free 
expression”); see also Brief of the Comm. on the Bill of Rights, of the ABA, as Friends of the Court, 
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651) 1939 WL 48753. 
 102 Grenville Clark to Charles Edmundson, 8 February 1940, Grenville Clark Papers, supra 
note 100, at box 78, folder 93; Frank Hogan to members of the Board of Governors, 14 February 
1939, Arthur T. Vanderbilt Political, Professional, and Judicial Papers, Wesleyan University Col-
lection on Legal Change, Middletown, Conn., box 123. 
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increasingly, businesses began to denounce government regulatory ef-
forts as infringements of First Amendment freedoms instead. By the 
end of the 1930s, the pamphlets and public addresses of the National 
Association of Manufacturers and Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States were rife with references to the First Amendment. After all, Jus-
tice Brandeis’s decision in Senn had compared labor picketing to adver-
tising, implicitly “invest[ing] both types of publicity pressures with the 
dignity of freedom of speech.”103 
The shift was swift and sweeping. In 1938, the NAM defended its 
anti-New Deal lobbying as an exercise of free expression.104 Just months 
after Thornhill was decided, the Chamber of Commerce highlighted the 
potential benefits of constitutional protection for commercial speech.105 
Above all, conservatives hoped that the First Amendment might chip 
away at Congress’s newly validated protections for organized labor. At 
the end of the decade, corporate lawyers and business groups de-
nounced the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for preventing the 
Ford Motor Company from distributing antiunion literature to its em-
ployees.106 What the agency characterized as an exercise of coercive in-
terference with the right to organize, Ford’s lawyers and supporters 
deemed an unlawful incursion on free expression. And the ACLU, con-
cerned that any abrogation of free expression on the basis of economic 
coercion would undermine First Amendment protection for the right to 
strike, joined business groups in chastising the NLRB for its abridg-
ment of free speech. 
It was a short road from a First Amendment defense of the right to 
oppose union activity to a First Amendment defense of the right to 
work.107 Although employers had long argued that union security agree-
ments (as well as strikes and boycotts) abridged the liberty interests of 
non-members—and federal courts proved willing to rely on the common 
law and antitrust protections to enjoin efforts to secure such conces-
sions—the voluntary nature of bargaining agreements between unions 
and employers in the pre-New Deal era weakened their link to federal 
constitutional law. According to antilabor advocates, the NLRA sup-
plied the requisite state action; and, in lieu of liberty of contract, the 
 
 103 Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937); Gregory, supra note 65, at 
712. 
 104 De Propaganda Fide, N.Y. HERALD-TRIBUNE, Mar. 6, 1938. 
 105 Garvin Croonquist, Letter to the Editor, Are Peddlers a Nuisance?, NATION’S BUSINESS, 
Sept. 1940, at 51 (noting that free speech protection for door-to-door salespeople not only increases 
competition but also supports local economies). 
 106 WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 43, at ch. 8. 
 107 On the right-to-work movement and its constitutional claims, see LEE, supra note 1. 
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First Amendment emerged as the most plausible hook for a constitu-
tional claim. By June 1941, Samuel Pettengill counseled his audience 
at the annual meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to uphold the 
“rights of the individual and of the minority” even as he decried the 
closed shop and declared the right of strikebreakers to cross the picket 
line,108 because the “equal right to work” was “the first right of all.”109 A 
few years later, opponents of unions learned to cast the closed shop as 
an independent incursion on free speech. “[N]o member dares to speak 
out or to combine with his fellow-members against the entrenched 
power of the union boss or so-called union majority,” insisted Cecil B. 
DeMille, an early architect of the right-to-work movement.110 
Such arguments were not lost on the critics of Lochner-era consti-
tutionalism who had so recently enlisted the Supreme Court to their 
point of view. Charles O. Gregory, a University of Chicago law professor 
and prominent labor scholar, captured widespread concerns when he 
criticized the Thornhill decision in the ABA Journal.111 According to 
Gregory, common law restraints on nonviolent union activity had no 
place in the post New Deal legal order. By the same token, state legis-
latures might sensibly protect union activity from employer interfer-
ence; the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in Truax v. Corrigan 
“still baffle[d] good lawyers.”112 On the other hand, it was no more le-
gitimate to shield labor picketing from state regulation on First Amend-
ment grounds than it was to insulate employers against state regula-
tion on the basis of liberty of contract. “True liberals in this country no 
longer look askance at economic compulsion,” Gregory argued, but to 
“call such coercion constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech” was 
a “perversion of an American ideal.”113 He reflected: 
For years the “Old Court” was under fire because of its doctrine 
of “substantive due process” developed to make possible the in-
validation of local legislative experiments. It now seems from the 
picketing cases of last Spring that the “New Court” is perpetu-
 
 108 Samuel Pettengill, What’s Ahead for America?, NATION’S BUSINESS, June 1941, at 36. 
 109 Id. at 47. 
 110 Quoted in LEE, supra note 1, at 73. 
 111 Gregory, supra note 65. 
 112 Id. at 711. On statutory protections of public sector employees’ right to organize, see JOSEPH 
E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–
1962 (2004). 
 113 Gregory, supra note 65, at 714. 
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ating this error by using the Fourteenth Amendment to estab-
lish its conception of the guaranties of liberty set forth in the 
First Amendment.114 
To Gregory, Thornhill and Carlson—like the Lochner-era cases before 
them—were dangerous usurpations of government authority to regu-
late labor relations. Gregory, in short, was lamenting the Lochneriza-
tion of the First Amendment. 
IV. LABOR’S CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE 
It is a deep irony of the interwar civil liberties movement that its 
overarching purpose was to inscribe into law a First Amendment right 
to picket, boycott, and strike, and yet those rights were written out of 
the First Amendment almost as soon as Carolene Products was decided. 
Presumably the justices of the Supreme Court were weighing assess-
ments like Charles Gregory’s when they sharply limited constitutional 
protection for labor activity just one year after introducing it. In 1941, 
the Court issued a decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Mead-
owmoor Dairies, Inc.,115 upholding a state court’s injunction against 
picketing by a union that had previously engaged in property destruc-
tion and violence. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
concluded that “utterance in a context of violence can lose its signifi-
cance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force,” 
and that subsequent picketing, even if peaceful, could constitutionally 
be enjoined.116 Frankfurter had earlier championed the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act,117 the landmark federal legislation that limited the federal 
courts’ injunctive power in labor disputes, and subsequent commenta-
tors have strained to explain his apparent about face.118 To many of his 
contemporaries, however, Frankfurter’s reasoning was apparent. Not 
only would expanding constitutional protection for union speech trench 
on legislative prerogatives; it would also open the door to First Amend-
ment claims by employers.119 As Charles Gregory mused, it was “disqui-
eting to hear proponents of organized labor applaud [Thornhill and 
 
 114 Id. at 714–15. 
 115 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
 116 Id. at 293. 
 117 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–15 (2016). 
 118 See especially FELIX FRANKFURTER AND NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 
(articulating Frankfurter and Greene’s critique of labor injunctions). 
 119 See, e.g., H. D., Memorandum for Messrs. Wood and McCormack, 13 February 1941, Ford 
Motor Company Legal Papers, Benson Ford Research Center, Dearborn, MI, acc. 897, box 4, vol. 5 
(speculating “that Justice Frankfurter was encouraged to go so far in limiting peaceful picketing 
because the ruling would establish a precedent which would sustain the Labor Board’s position on 
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Carlson] and then condemn a manufacturer who, contrary to the terms 
of the Wagner Act, insists upon telling his employees exactly what he 
thinks of a certain labor union and why.”120 Some groups, including the 
ACLU, thought the solution was to safeguard the First Amendment 
rights of unions and employers alike. Many New Dealers, including 
many judges, preferred to withhold constitutional protection from both. 
As the 1940s unfolded, it was the latter approach that prevailed. 
When strikes or pickets were most effective, and therefore most coer-
cive, they lost their status as constitutionally protected expression.121 
No doubt judges and justices were motivated by a range of competing 
concerns. Some were driven by an abiding commitment to judicial re-
straint, lest Lochnerism rear its head. Reflecting backwards, they wor-
ried that the invigoration of the First Amendment would lead to judicial 
usurpation of the police power in the service of industry. Others inter-
preted the massive strike wave at the end of the Second World War as 
evidence that the labor law pendulum had swung too far toward orga-
nized labor. Before the New Deal, courts had suppressed strikes and 
boycotts while extending constitutional protection to yellow-dog con-
tracts and extolling the virtues of the open shop. A decade later, strikes 
were constitutionally protected and yellow-dog contracts were not. As 
union membership skyrocketed and workers voiced the demands they 
had tabled during the war, many Americans blamed the New Deal labor 
law regime for excessively inflating union power; some judges presum-
ably agreed. Still others remained personally partial to organized labor 
but believed that the legitimacy and survival of constitutional liberal-
ism required the Court to avoid the appearance of bias in its application 
of countermajoritarian principles. Conservative efforts to embed the 
right to work in the First Amendment did not directly succeed in the 
1940s, at least in the courts, but they may have achieved a more atten-
uated victory in checking the labor vision of civil liberties. No doubt the 
specter of a First Amendment right to work affected the litigants and 
advocates who engaged with the First Amendment right to strike. 
 
free speech”). 
 120 Gregory, supra note 65, at 715. 
 121 See, e.g., Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Giboney v. Em-
pire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). The Supreme Court did, however, 
continue to recognize limited speech rights in the context of labor organizing. See, e.g., Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). For explanation and discussion of this trajectory, see James Gray 
Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 
(2004); James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to Or-
ganize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941 (1999); Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rut-
ter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 295–300 
(2015). 
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The First Amendment labor cases of the 1940s and 1950s crystal-
ized into a compact that lasted, with some modifications at the margins, 
for more than fifty years. Over the course of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court unceremoniously denied constitutional protection to the 
very modes of expression that it pronounced core to First Amendment 
ideals in other domains. A long list of labor law’s First Amendment 
anomalies is easy to assemble. The same collective bargaining agree-
ments that require non-members to contribute agency fees also require 
both members and non-members to forgo much more recognizable First 
Amendment expression while the contract is in effect. Yet the Court has 
long since deemed no-strike clauses enforceable by injunction, notwith-
standing the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.122 Meanwhile, the 
NLRA directly limits recognitional picketing and secondary activity, 
along with wildcat strikes.123 And of course, many states simply prohibit 
strikes by public sector workers, in terms that far outstrip the usual 
latitude afforded states in regulating government employees. In the or-
dinary political context, of course, picketing is quintessential First 
Amendment activity, and declining to protect it would be virtually un-
fathomable.124 Labor picketing, labor boycotts, and union associational 
activity are all routinely curbed by the state.125 
V. CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS FROM LOCHNER 
As the Roberts Court has forged ahead with the Lochnerization of 
the First Amendment, it has begun to expand constitutional protections 
for employees who object to the payment of union dues. It has curtailed 
the ability of public sector unions to collect payments toward ideological 
 
 122 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Loc. 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). 
 123 See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (“The substan-
tive evil condemned by Congress in § 8(b)(4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have recog-
nized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlaw-
ful objectives. There is no reason why Congress may not do likewise.”). 
 124 For a comprehensive analysis of the inconsistency between the labor and non-labor picket-
ing cases, see Fisk & Rutter, supra note 121, at 300–15. Earlier scholarship examining the differ-
ential treatment of labor speech includes Cynthia Estlund, Labor Picketing and Commercial 
Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L. J. 938 (1982); Mark D. 
Schneider, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1982). 
 125 See supra note 124. On boycotts, compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 
(1982) (extending First Amendment protection to civil rights boycotting), with International Long-
shoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (upholding Congress’ authority 
to prohibit secondary boycotting under the NLRA). The Court has also arguably favored corpora-
tions over labor unions in the campaign finance context. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Citizens, 
United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2011); 
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Associa-
tional Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Loc. 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2013). 
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activity by adjusting the default rules of non-member contributions,126 
and it has reduced the class of state-funded workers covered by 
Abood.127 Thus far, it has declined to extend reciprocal protection to la-
bor’s expressive activity. It has evinced no readiness to reevaluate prec-
edent rejecting unions’ freedom of association claims,128 and it has ac-
cepted statutory restrictions on secondary activity and the right to 
strike. This outcome would have been a tremendous surprise to inter-
war advocates and judges. At the end of the New Deal, all the signs 
pointed the other way. Unions enjoyed burgeoning First Amendment 
rights, whereas the objections of non-members were of minimal consti-
tutional concern.129 
If the Supreme Court recognizes a First Amendment right to work 
in Janus v. AFSCME, a cascade of cases will follow. As an initial matter, 
the dues-paying members in that new regime may plausibly object that 
the government is forcing them to subsidize non-members in violation 
of their First Amendment rights.130 But the slippery slope is steeper 
than that. Union members may also feel that an injunction to enforce a 
no-strike clause is incompatible with the First Amendment. They may 
argue that they are entitled to express their solidarity with other strug-
gling workers—that picketing over disputes at distant workplaces is 
protected by the Constitution, even when unions are involved.131 For 
their part, the right-to-work forces are almost certain to transpose their 
argument onto private sector labor law, which the Supreme Court (side-
stepping a significant state action question with respect to constitu-
tional claims132) has proven inclined to align with its public sector deci-
sions as a matter of statutory interpretation. And they have already 
 
 126 See Knox v. SEIU, Loc. 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 127 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 128 See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Hwy. Emps., Loc. 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (“The public 
employee surely can associate and speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the 
First Amendment from retaliation for doing so. . . . But the First Amendment does not impose any 
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the 
association and bargain with it.”). Cf. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 
2013). Section 1 of the NLRA declares Congress’ commitment to “protecting the exercise by work-
ers of full freedom of association.” 
 129 As Charles Gregory explained, unions had “won the support of thousands of intellectual 
leaders who are actuated by the social movement aspects of unionism and who seem to have ig-
nored the dangers of the sort of power which federated universal closed shops may bring.” Gregory, 
supra note 65, at 714. 
 130 See Fisk & Poueymirou, supra note 32, at 470–72, 482–85. 
 131 See Fisk & Rutter, supra note 121, at 322–28, for an argument that the NLRB should ex-
pand its protection of secondary activity as a matter of statutory interpretation to avoid infringing 
on the First Amendment. For a broad contemporary defense of the “constitutional right to organ-
ize,” see Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Constitutional Right to Organize (Working Paper, Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864100 [https://perma.cc/4PHU-FKNH]. 
 132 On the state action problem in private sector labor law, see generally LEE, supra note 1. 
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asked the Supreme Court to reassess the First Amendment status of 
public sector exclusive representation.133 
One might imagine that the Court’s one-sided First Amendment 
expansion will prove difficult to contain. In fact, lower courts have be-
gun to narrow the class of secondary activity subject to regulation. And 
to the extent the justices hold the line, they will open themselves to the 
same charges of hypocrisy and antilabor bias that beset their Lochner-
era forebears. Moving forward, lawyers, litigants, and judges will have 
to decide whether robust First Amendment review of labor law would 
ultimately serve their interests, and at what cost.134 
During the decades after the Constitutional Revolution, the Su-
preme Court insisted that the First Amendment must occasionally yield 
to legislative choices about “the competing interests of unions, employ-
ers, their employees, and the public at large.”135 In upholding a state 
injunction against peaceful picketing in the 1957 decision Teamsters 
Union v. Vogt,136 Justice Frankfurter explained on behalf of the Su-
preme Court majority that constitutional protection for free speech did 
not immunize labor activity from state regulation.137 In a mournful dis-
sent, Justice Douglas described the decision as a “formal surrender.”138 
“[F]or practical purposes,” he explained, the law had reverted to the 
“situation . . . as it was when Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union was 
decided.”139 Organized labor was protected by statute rather than the 
Constitution, as it was in the brief period been between the Supreme 
Court’s validation of the NLRA in Jones & Laughlin Steel and its sub-
sequent decisions elevating union activity to First Amendment status. 
That is, labor picketing was subject to government regulation, as it was 
before the modern First Amendment took shape. 
But in accusing the Court of “com[ing] full circle,”140 Justice Doug-
las exaggerated the extent of the Court’s retreat. The picketing deci-
sions of the mid-twentieth century reflected a durable compromise, pur-
suant to which both labor and antiunion activity were insulated from 
 
 
 133 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hill v. SEIU, 85 U.S.L.W. 46 (U.S. June 8, 2017), cert. denied,  
86 U.S.L.W. 18 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2017). 
 134 For a compelling explanation of the contemporary labor movement’s reluctance to embrace 
a constitutional strategy, see Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591 
(2016). 
 135 Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957). 
 136 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
 137 Id. at 289. 
 138 Id. at 297 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 295. 
20 WEINRIB PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/17 9:12 PM 
536  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM  
 
First Amendment challenge. Lurking behind labor’s First Amendment 
exceptionalism was the recognition that the postwar labor law regime, 
with its complicated balancing of employer and worker rights, had op-
erated to dampen industrial unrest and facilitate American economic 
growth.141 To advance these goals—which may have seemed like “com-
pelling government interests,” though the accommodation was rarely 
framed in conventional doctrinal terms—the courts constrained the op-
eration of the First Amendment in the labor context. Just as an une-
quivocal right to strike would unleash unpalatable economic power, an 
unequivocal right to work would disturb the New Deal settlement and 
impugn the legitimacy of the courts, not to mention the stability of the 
postwar legal order. 
Against this broader backdrop, recognizing a First Amendment ob-
stacle to public sector agency fees threatens to unweave the web. To 
couch the right to work in the Constitution while licensing courts and 
legislatures to suppress the right to strike would truly be to “come full 
circle.” It would replicate the constitutional dynamics of the Lochner 
era, an approach excoriated by generations of scholars and judges for 
its lopsided attentiveness to the interests of antiunion workers and em-
ployers.142 It would, in short, mark a return “for practical purposes” to 
the “situation . . . as it was” before Jones & Laughlin Steel was decided. 
And the situation then, it bears remembering, was a world on the brink 
of revolution. 
 
 141 The tradeoffs entailed by the NLRB’s state-centered approach are discussed in Karl E. 
Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiograhy of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 450 (1981); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner 
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); 
Christpher L. Tomlins, The New Deal, Collective Bargaining and the Triumph of Industrial Plu-
ralism, 39 IND. LAB. REL. REV. 19 (1985). 
 142 See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1-7, 108–24 (2011) (characterizing Lochner as “the most 
disreputable case in modern constitutional discourse”); see also Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
